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For nearly a decade, DNA-on-arrest laws eluded scrutiny in the courts.  For another 
five years, they withstood a gathering storm of constitutional challenges.  In Maryland 
v. King, however, Maryland’s highest court reasoned that usually fingerprints provide 
everything police need to establish the true identity of an individual before trial and 
that the state’s interest in finding the perpetrators of crimes by trawling databases 
of DNA profiles is too “generalized” to support “a warrantless, suspicionless search.” 
The U.S. Supreme Court reacted forcefully. Chief Justice Roberts stayed the Maryland 
judgment, writing that “given the considered analysis of courts on the other side of 
the split, there is a fair prospect that this Court will reverse the decision below.”  The 
full Court then granted a writ of certiorari.  This essay examines the opinions listed by 
the Chief Justice and finds their analysis incomplete.  I outline the Fourth Amendment 
questions that a fully considered analysis must answer, identify questionable dicta on 
the definition of “searches” and “seizures” in the opinions, describe a fundamental 
disagreement over the analytical framework for evaluating the reasonable warrantless 
searches or seizures, and criticize a creative compromise in one of the opinions that 
would allow sample collection without DNA testing before conviction.  I conclude 
that in King, the Supreme Court not only must assess the actual interests implicated 
by pre-conviction collection and profiling of DNA, but it also should articulate the 
appropriate framework for evaluating the reasonableness of warrantless searches in 
general.
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INTRODUCTION 
For nearly a decade, DNA-on-arrest laws eluded scrutiny in the courts.1  
For another five years, they withstood a gathering storm of constitutional chal-
lenges.2  They suffered a stunning blow, however, when Maryland’s highest court 
effectively struck down the state’s law3 providing for routine DNA collection and 
analysis before a conviction (DNA-BC).  The major rationale for such laws is 
that the state can compare an arrestee’s DNA identification profile4 to a database 
of profiles from crime scenes.  Thus, when Alonzo King, Jr., was arrested and 
charged with an assault in 2009, the state collected a sample of his DNA as 
mandated in its statute, derived an identification profile without inspecting more 
privacy-laden parts of his genome, and found a match in the state database for 
unsolved crimes.  Based on evidence derived from this database hit, the state 
charged King with a 2003 first-degree rape.5  King moved, unsuccessfully, to sup-
press the DNA evidence linking him to that rape.  Before Maryland’s interme-
diate court could hear King’s appeal, the state’s highest court acted to decide 
the case.6  It reasoned that usually fingerprints provide everything police need to 
establish the true identity of an individual before trial7 and that the state’s interest 
in finding the perpetrators of unsolved crimes by trawling databases of DNA 
profiles is too “generalized” to support “a warrantless, suspicionless search.”8 
  
1. No published opinions appeared from the enactment of the first law in Louisiana in 1997 through 
2005.  See David H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Collection Before Conviction: An Updated 
Scorecard, FORENSIC SCI. STAT. & LAW (Nov. 10, 2012, 10:59 PM), http://for-sci-law-
now.blogspot.com/2012/11/the-constitionality-of-dna-collection.html. 
2. The only appellate defeat before 2012 came in In re C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2006). 
3. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 2-501 to 2-514 (LexisNexis 2011). 
4. The profile is a list of twenty-six numbers that give the lengths of selected short tandem repeats 
(STRs), which constitute a miniscule fraction of the genome.  See DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE 
HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 187–91 (2010).  These numbers do not seem to be predict-
ably related to external traits or health status.  Brief of Genetics, Genomics, and Forensic Sci. 
Researchers as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Maryland v. King, No. 12-207 (U.S. 
Dec. 28, 2012); D.H. Kaye, Please, Let’s Bury the Junk: The CODIS Loci and the Revelation of Private 
Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 70 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/ 
lawreview/colloquy/2007/25. 
5. King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 553–54 (Md. 2012). 
6. Id. at 555. 
7. The Maryland Court of Appeals held the law was unconstitutional as applied to an arrestee for 
whom the state had no “problems whatsoever identifying accurately . . . through traditional 
booking routines.”  Id. at 579. 
8. Id. at 578. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court reacted forcefully.  Even before the Court met to 
consider granting a writ of certiorari,9 Chief Justice Roberts stayed the Maryland 
judgment.10  His in-chambers opinion stated that, “given the considered analysis 
of courts on the other side of the split, there is a fair prospect that this Court will 
reverse the decision below.”11  In chronological order, the opinions that received the 
Chief Justice’s approbation come from Virginia (Anderson v. Commonwealth12), 
the Third Circuit (United States v. Mitchell 13), and the Ninth Circuit (Haskell v. 
Harris14).  The Chief Justice cited the fourth opinion—from the Arizona Supreme 
Court (Mario W. v. Kaipio15)—separately, as it straddles the divide with a no-
peeking rule that permits collection but not testing of DNA before conviction.16  
I shall call these four cases the “stay-opinion cases.” 
This Essay briefly examines these opinions.  My objective is limited.  I do 
not consider whether these cases were decided correctly or incorrectly.  Rather, 
I ask whether the opinions supply a fully “considered analysis” of the Fourth 
Amendment as it applies to arrestee DNA databases.  I argue that the Supreme 
Court will need to engage in a deeper and more precise analysis, and I indicate 
how that analysis might proceed. 
The Fourth Amendment comprises two clauses.  The Reasonableness 
Clause grandly guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”17  
The Warrant Clause specifies that “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”18  A thorough analysis of the 
Amendment as applied to DNA-BC therefore requires the resolution of three 
issues: (1) Is there a “search or seizure”?  (2) If so, what rule or standard de-
termines the reasonableness of that search or seizure?  (3) Under this rule or 
standard, is the particular system for DNA-BC reasonable? 
With these questions in mind, Part I discusses the three opinions uphold-
ing DNA-BC in its entirety.  It shows that these opinions do not convincingly 
resolve the first two questions and that they treat the third with varying de-
  
9. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012). 
10. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.). 
11. Id.. 
12. 650 S.E.2d 702 (Va. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1054 (2008). 
13. 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1741 (2012). 
14. 669 F.3d 1049, reh’g en banc granted, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). 
15. 281 P.3d 476 (Ariz. 2012). 
16. King, 133 S. Ct. at 2 (citing Mario W. v. Kaipio, 281 P.3d 476 (Ariz. 2012)). 
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
18. Id. 
108 60 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 104 (2013) 
 
grees of care.  Part II examines the Arizona compromise that allows DNA 
collection—but not profiling—prior to conviction or after failure to appear for an 
adjudication.  It argues that the doctrinal analysis in Mario W. departs from ex-
isting Fourth Amendment law and does not meet the concern, expressed by the dis-
senting judges in the other stay-opinion cases (and by the majority in King), that 
DNA samples will be used to acquire highly private information rather than mere-
ly an identifying profile. 
I. THE “CONSIDERED ANALYSIS” IN ANDERSON, HASKELL, 
AND MITCHELL 
A. Search or Seizure Points 
As many as five steps in the process of constructing and using DNA da-
tabases conceivably might qualify as a search or seizure and hence trigger Fourth 
Amendment protections.  These are (1) the collection of physical samples from 
the body, (2) the chemical or physical extraction and testing of the DNA mole-
cules in the sample to ascertain their composition at various locations (“loci”), 
(3) the database entry of the resulting DNA profiles, (4) the trawls of the da-
tabase for matches to profiles from crime-scene samples, and (5) the long-term 
storage of the physical samples.  The attacks on DNA-BC in the main stay-
opinion cases are directed only at the first step in the database process—the ac-
quisition of the sample.19  This is familiar territory, for innumerable opinions 
involving DNA samples collected after conviction (DNA-AC) have denom-
inated the usual methods of DNA sampling (from the interior of the body) 
as searches.  In contrast, the later four steps affect the reasonableness of the initial 
and contested DNA collection but do not themselves constitute searches or 
seizures.  Nevertheless, dicta in the stay-opinion cases depart from the Supreme 
Court’s approach to defining “searches or seizures.”  To demonstrate this, a 
brief description of that approach is in order. 
  
19. At the other end of the spectrum, a number of cases hold or imply “that the government’s retention 
and matching of [a] profile against other profiles in CODIS [COmbined DNA Index System] 
does not violate an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable, and 
thus does not constitute a separate search under the Fourth Amendment.”  Boroian v. Mueller, 
616 F.3d 60, 67–68 (1st Cir. 2010).  For a defense of this result, see David H. Kaye, DNA Database 
Trawls and the Definition of a Search in Boroian v. Mueller, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 41 (2011), 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2011/08/04/kaye.pdf. 
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1. Defining Searches and Seizures 
An individual’s Fourth Amendment interests with respect to searches, 
on the one hand, and seizures, on the other, are distinct.20  The modern doctrine 
for defining a search begins with the well-known formula articulated by Justice 
Harlan in Katz v. United States.21  By placing a recording device on the top of a 
public telephone booth, the FBI overheard Katz transmit gambling infor-
mation in violation of federal law.  Katz argued that this monitoring was a 
search even though the Court had previously required a “physical pene-
tration”22 of a “protected area”23—that is to say, a trespass.24  Katz jettisoned 
these requirements and substituted a less confining “reasonable expectation 
of privacy” standard.25  Katz’s solitary occupancy of the booth to engage in pri-
vate conversations created just such a reasonable expectation and hence made 
the monitoring a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  And 
because the government could point to no exception to the established rule 
that searches conducted without prior judicial approval are unreasonable, the 
warrantless electronic eavesdropping contravened the Fourth Amendment. 26 
In the succeeding five decades, the Court has applied the Katz formula to 
a bewildering array of information-gathering techniques and technologies—
from aerial overflights27 and photography,28 to electronic tracking devices,29 to 
thermal imaging,30 to the extraction of bodily fluids for drug 31 and alcohol32 
tests.  Most recently, in United States v. Jones,33 a majority of the Court supple-
  
20. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
21. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
22. Id. at 352. 
23. Id. at 350–51. 
24. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001).  But see Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth 
Amendment Searches, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2154611 (arguing that although property concepts always were 
important in defining a search under the Fourth Amendment, the standard view, recounted here, 
that Katz overturned a technical trespass-based test is incorrect). 
25. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).  But see United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945, 951 (2012) (treating Katz as supplementing rather than replacing the trespass-based 
mode of analysis). 
26. Katz, 389 U.S. at 356–57 (majority opinion). 
27. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
28. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
29. Compare United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), with United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 
276 (1983). 
30. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
31. E.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
32. E.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
33. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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mented the ductile Katz standard34 with an historical trespass-based rule.35  This 
time, the FBI, without a warrant, attached to the underside of a car a device that 
transmitted its GPS coordinates for twenty-eight days.36  A unanimous Court 
found this method of acquiring information to be a search.  A plurality of four 
Justices, led by Justice Alito, determined that the lengthy surveillance was a 
search because it violated a reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz.37  
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, however, deemed the installation of the GPS 
tracker to be a search regardless of the duration of the tracking because attaching 
the device was an eighteenth-century trespass to chattels followed by “an attempt 
to find something or to obtain information.”38  After Jones, acquiring information 
triggers the Fourth Amendment when undertaken (1) in a manner that violates a 
reasonable expectation of privacy or (2) by a common law trespass to property or 
chattels.  Only these two types of information-gathering methods are searches 
that trigger Fourth Amendment protections.39 
A seizure is a different constitutional animal.  It can occur without a search, 
and a search can take place without a seizure.  Indeed, the Jones Court rejected the 
view that the trespass in attaching the GPS device was a seizure of the car.40  A 
seizure deprives a person of the possession of property 41 or prevents an individual 
from moving away.42  The informational aspect that is common to searches need 
not be present.  For example, jailing an individual solely to assure an appearance 
for an arraignment or a trial is a seizure of the person that triggers the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections even if the arrestee never is searched.43 
  
34. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (“The Katz test—whether the individual has an expectation of privacy that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable—has often been criticized as circular, and hence 
subjective and unpredictable.”). 
35. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953 (“[U]nlike the concurrence, which would make Katz the exclusive test, we 
do not make trespass the exclusive test.  Situations . . . without trespass would remain subject to 
Katz analysis.” (emphasis omitted)). 
36. Id. at 945. 
37. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of 
most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy. . . . [S]ociety’s expectation has been that law 
enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly 
monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”). 
38. Id. at 951 n.5 (majority opinion) (Scalia, J.). 
39. Id. (“A trespass on ‘houses’ or ‘effects,’ or a Katz invasion of privacy, is not alone a search unless it is 
done to obtain information; and the obtaining of information is not alone a search unless it is 
achieved by such a trespass or invasion of privacy.”). 
40. Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The Court does not contend that there was a seizure.”). 
41. “A ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s 
possessory interests in that property.”  United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
42. E.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (detaining someone while his house is being 
searched is a seizure of the person); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (concluding that an 
investigatory stop of an individual is a seizure of the person). 
43. E.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
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2. Infelicities in the Stay-Opinion Cases 
In 2007, the Virginia Supreme Court became the first major appellate 
court to uphold the practice of DNA sampling on arrest.  In Anderson v. 
Commonwealth,44 the court framed the question before it as whether “the taking 
of a person’s DNA upon arrest for certain crimes constitutes an unconstitu-
tional seizure.”45  This phrasing invites confusion.  In ordinary speech, re-
moving a small quantity of superficial material from the inside of the cheek 
certainly is a seizure of that material, but as I have just described, the term 
has a more technical meaning.  Rubbing off some cells that no one will miss prob-
ably is not a seizure in this sense.  Just as the installation of the GPS tracker in 
Jones did not degrade the vehicle’s performance, the simple removal of surplus 
cells does not harm the person.  The only seizure-type interference comes in re-
quiring the person to sit still for swabbing, but considering that the person al-
ready is locked up, the limitation on freedom of movement is minimal.  The 
Anderson court recognized as much in a one-sentence footnote: “While 
Anderson refers to the taking of buccal swabs as a ‘seizure,’ it is more appro-
priately referred to as a ‘search.’”46 
That buccal swabbing to gather identifying information is a search is 
clear from Cupp v. Murphy.47  Cupp held that scraping away suspicious material 
under the fingernails of a nervous suspect who was in custody was a search 
(but a reasonable one under the exception to the warrant requirement for 
exigent circumstances).  There is no indication that the Court considered 
the additional but minimal interference with the freedom of movement of a 
legitimately detained individual to be a seizure.  Thus, in a Second Circuit 
DNA-AC case, Judge Calabresi carefully explained that “DNA indexing 
statutes, because they authorize both a physical intrusion to obtain a tissue 
  
44. 650 S.E.2d 702 (Va. 2007). 
45. Id. at 703. 
46. Id. at 706 n.2 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616–17 (1989); 
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767–68 
(1966); United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 2007)).  The court in the fourth 
stay-opinion case repeatedly referred to “the seizure of buccal cells,” but it also referred to the 
laboratory analysis of the cells as a “second search,” arguably implying that the initial seizure 
actually was a search instead of a seizure.  Mario W. v. Kaipio, 281 P.3d 476, 481 (Ariz. 2012) 
(emphasis added). 
47. 412 U.S. 291 (1973). 
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sample and a chemical analysis to obtain private physiological information 
about a person, are subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.”48 
The other two cases fully upholding DNA-BC barely touched on the 
question of whether mandatory DNA collection was a search, for the gov-
ernment conceded this threshold point in the Third Circuit case, United States v. 
Mitchell,49 and in the Ninth Circuit case, Haskell v. Harris.50  However, Mitchell 
did not stop with the observation that acquiring blood or other cells from inside 
the body is a search.  It added that “of course” there was a “second ‘search’ at 
issue,” namely, “the processing of the DNA sample and creation of the DNA 
profile.”51  If this dictum were taken at face value and divorced from the mandatory, 
penetrating body intrusion, it could mean that a range of laboratory tests of 
evidence acquired from a known suspect or his possessions without any mean-
ingful physical intrusion on his person or property could not ordinarily be per-
formed without probable cause and a warrant.  Although the Supreme Court has 
spoken of a laboratory test for metabolites in urine as if it might be a search on its 
own,52 other cases have rejected the view that tests of physical substances are 
necessarily searches.53 
Thus, the existence of an independent “second search” in Mitchell is less ob-
vious than that court suggested.  In a colloquial sense, there certainly is a sec-
ond search.  The laboratory is gathering (“searching for”) information about a 
small number of loci on the strands of the DNA molecules extracted from 
the cells.54  But not every information-gathering act is a search.  In calling DNA 
analysis a search for information, the Mitchell court was acknowledging that 
what transpires in the laboratory “has the potential to infringe upon privacy 
interests” because of “the vast amount of sensitive information that can be 
  
48. United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).  For additional 
discussion of these factors, see David H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 455 (2001). 
49. 652 F.3d 387, 406 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
50. 669 F.3d 1049, reh’g en banc granted, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). 
51. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 407. 
52. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (“[Because] chemical analysis of 
urine . . . can reveal a host of private medical facts . . . , including whether [someone] is epileptic, 
pregnant, or diabetic . . . [, and because] the process of collecting the sample to be tested, which 
may in some cases involve visual or aural monitoring of the act of urination, itself implicates 
privacy interests . . . [, it follows that] the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations 
of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable, . . . and . . . these intrusions must be 
deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment.”).  
53. See infra Part II. 
54. For a description of the current procedure for deriving a DNA identification profile from cells, see 
KAYE, supra note 4, at 178–91. 
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mined from a person’s DNA.”55  To mine the DNA for sensitive information 
(such as disease status or risks) could well be thought to infringe reasonable 
expectations of privacy.  As such, it could turn the second step of DNA da-
tabanking into a separate search under Katz.  But unless this potential in-
fringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy becomes real—unless the 
police do mine the DNA for more sensitive information than that which is 
present in the existing profiles stored in DNA identification databases56—the 
colloquial second search is no more than a potential second search under 
the Fourth Amendment.57 
In sum, Anderson, Haskell, and Mitchell confirm that an entry into the 
body to acquire information constitutes a search.  If the government were to 
do its DNA sampling so as to avoid the bodily intrusion into the mouth (via 
a sticky pad applied to the outside of the skin, for example), there would 
more room for argument under the post-Katz cases involving biological search-
es.58  But if the first three stay-opinion cases are to be faulted in their brief 
discussions of the definitional issue, it is only because of the loose allusions to a 
“seizure” in Anderson and a “second search” in Mitchell. 
B. Balancing vs. Categorizing 
As with the definitional issue of what constitutes a search or seizure, 
most of the stay-opinion cases quickly pass over the second issue of the doc-
trinal framework that should be used to ascertain the reasonableness of col-
lecting DNA for database use before conviction.  In Katz, Justice Stewart 
explained that “[o]ver and again this Court has emphasized that . . . searches 
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject 
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”59  Yet, 
  
55. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 407 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 
73, 85 (2d Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
56. On the nature of the information in the current profiles, see supra note 4.  There are no reported 
incidents of police performing tests for disease-causing variants of genes or giving samples to health 
insurers or employers. 
57. Cf. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) (“The mere transfer to Karo of a can 
containing an unmonitored beeper infringed no privacy interest . . . . To be sure, it created a 
potential for an invasion of privacy, but we have never held that potential, as opposed to 
actual, invasions of privacy constitute searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
58. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ 
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
59. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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rather than identifying an appropriate exception, the main stay opinions apply 
a direct balancing test in which the absence of a warrant and probable cause 
are merely two considerations among many in the totality of the circum-
stances. 
The Anderson opinion’s reasoning can be collapsed into a few sentences: 
The routine booking process includes the taking of fingerprints, which is surely 
constitutional; DNA sampling is like fingerprinting because it provides evi-
dence of identity without significant physical intrusion; and the balance of 
individual and state interests therefore allows DNA-BC.60  Whether or not one 
agrees with this conclusion, it leaves the basis for choosing a balancing test—
rather than demanding a categorical exception that would apply to warrantless 
DNA-BC—a mystery. 
The majority opinion in the Ninth Circuit’s Haskell v. Harris fills the gap 
with but a few sentences.  In this class action, the district court had refused 
to issue a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of California’s 
Proposition 69, which initiated DNA-BC in that state.61  Over a sharp dis-
sent, the majority concluded that the California law is reasonable within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment in light of the totality of the circumstanc-
es.62  To justify totality balancing, Judge Smith jarringly proclaimed that this 
direct weighing of the competing individual and state interests was a conse-
quence of “the Constitution’s plain text.”63 
What plain text?  The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable search-
es or seizures and refers to judicial warrants based on probable cause.  It is 
silent on whether the addition of the Warrant Clause to the proscription of 
unreasonable searches helps determine which searches are reasonable, and 
the historical record is “foggy.”64  As a result, there is much academic debate 
over the degree to which the Warrant Clause modifies the Reasonableness Clause.65  
  
60. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 705–06 (Va. 2007). 
61. Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
62. The critique of the dissent and the discussion of the majority opinion that follows draws on 
David H. Kaye, Drawing Lines: Unrelated Probable Cause as a Prerequisite to Early DNA Collection, 
91 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 1 (2012), http://www.nclawreview.org/documents/91/addendum/ 
kaye.pdf. 
63. Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 
434 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1977)). 
64. TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24 (1969).  
For a description of competing theories, see Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, 
His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 983 (2011), and Cynthia Lee, Package 
Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the Disappearing Container Doctrine Can Tell Us About 
the Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1403, 1408 (2010). 
65. For a sampling of the contentious literature, see Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First 
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994), Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth 
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The Supreme Court has resolved the issue by reading the Warrant Clause into 
the Reasonableness Clause to derive the categorical rule, articulated in Katz 
and many other cases, that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable.66  To 
be sure, the Court has balanced to derive previously unrecognized categorical 
exceptions such as the one that allows the limited stop-and-frisk procedure 
described in Terry v. Ohio.67  In addition, the Court balances at a pro-
grammatic level in a sprawling category of “special needs” or “administrative 
search” cases that involve interests beyond the collection of evidence for 
criminal investigations or trials.68  Special needs searches thus fall within an 
established exception to the per se rule.  The Supreme Court has resorted to 
ad hoc balancing in only two difficult-to-justify cases—United States v. 
Knights,69 involving a probationer, and Samson v. California,70 involving a 
parolee.  A considered opinion engaging in totality balancing would have to 
explain why these cases apply to individuals who have not been convicted 
and who are not on probation or parole.71 
Haskell barely tries.  Proceeding on its premise that every case is appropri-
ate for ad hoc balancing, the majority rejects the categorical approach that 
would necessitate a special needs showing (or some other exception to the 
warrant requirement) on the ground that in Bell v. Wolfish,72 “the Supreme 
Court even applied the totality of the circumstances test to determine whether 
strip searches of pretrial detainees were constitutional.”73  Although Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in Bell does speak of the direct balancing 
  
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999), Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth 
Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925 (1997), and David E. Steinberg, An 
Original Misunderstanding: Akhil Amar and Fourth Amendment History, 42 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 227 (2005). 
66. E.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011); City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 
2630 (2010); Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) (articulating “the basic rule”).  The 
only Supreme Court cases offered to support totality balancing in Haskell—namely, Terry and 
Mimms—apply the categorical rule.  See Kaye, supra note 62, at 16. 
67. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
68. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
69. 534 U.S. 112 (2001). 
70. 547 U.S. 843 (2006). 
71. In the DNA-AC context, most circuits have not relied on the balancing appropriate to special 
needs cases.  See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 404 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citing 
cases).  For DNA collection from probationers and parolees, it is easier to invoke Knights and 
Samson and their totality balancing.  Nevertheless, a case can be made for applying the special needs 
exception instead.  See David H. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory for Arrestee DNA and 
Other Biometric Databases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2043259. 
72. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
73. Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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of interests as if it were the norm for all Fourth Amendment cases,74 Bell 
clearly is a special needs case.  The need to balance in that case flowed from 
the government’s special interest in safely confining prisoners.  To read the 
case as a blanket repudiation of the per se rule would be extravagant. 
Mitchell makes the same mistake.  The majority suggests the normal 
mode of Fourth Amendment analysis is a direct “balancing of competing 
interests.”75  It reaches this conclusion without mentioning the veritable wall 
of cases (like Katz) that cannot possibly be described as “[b]alancing the totali-
ty of the circumstances.”76  For the implicit repudiation of all these cases, 
Mitchell cites (without discussion) several Supreme Court cases.  One is Bell.  As 
we have just seen, however, Bell merely is one of many cases that permits 
balancing only within the exception to the per se rule for special interests such as 
jail security,77 highway safety,78 and drug-free schools.79 
Mitchell also cites Tennessee v. Garner.80  Yet, the Garner Court never dis-
cussed the general method for gauging the reasonableness of a search.  There 
was not even a search in that case.  The sole Fourth Amendment issue was 
whether a seizure—effected by a police shooting of an unarmed teenager climb-
ing a fence to elude arrest—was reasonable.  The state argued that, as long 
as police have probable cause to arrest, “the Fourth Amendment has nothing 
to say about how that seizure is made.”81  Garner rejected this narrow rule about 
seizures—courts obviously must evaluate whether the level of force is jus-
tified under the circumstances.  This review of the execution of seizures does 
not change the rule that searches are per se unreasonable when they lack 
probable cause and a warrant.82 
  
74. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. 
75. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 403. 
76. Id. 
77. E.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012). 
78. E.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
79. E.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).  For a recent effort to impose a certain structure 
on these variegated cases, see Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 254 (2011). 
80. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
81. Id. at 7. 
82. Garner quoted Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981), for the proposition that 
“the key principle of the Fourth Amendment” is reasonableness—“the balancing of 
competing interests.”  Garner, 471 U.S. at 8.  The Mitchell court quoted these words as 
supporting its understanding that warrantless searches are no longer per se unreasonable in 
the absence of a categorical exception, such as the special needs exception.  United States v. 
Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 403 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).  But the issue in Summers was 
whether the owner of a house could be detained without probable cause while the police 
searched the premises.  Summers balanced to define the limits of a Terry-type temporary stop 
of a person—one that is less serious than a formal arrest and that therefore might be justified 
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Finally, Mitchell quotes Chief Justice Rehnquist in Knights as announc-
ing that the “general Fourth Amendment approach” entails “examining the 
totality of the circumstances.”83  But rather than demonstrating the overthrow of 
the categorical rule for searches, the Chief Justice was only quoting his ear-
lier opinion in Ohio v. Robinette,84 a case rejecting a flat rule that a police 
officer must advise a driver that he is free to go if the driver’s consent to in-
terrogation is to be valid.85  To rely on the dicta in Knights as proving that 
totality balancing suddenly extends beyond searches of probationers, to all 
searches under all circumstances, only begs the question of whether the type 
of balancing in Knights should be applied to DNA-BC.  It is, of course, pos-
sible that a majority of the Supreme Court will agree to scuttle the per se rule 
for warrantless searches (and that Chief Justice Rehnquist in Bell, Robinette, 
and Knights was seeking to lay the groundwork for just such a result), but 
surely the Justices cannot use the logic of Haskell and Mitchell that this al-
ready has happened to justify such a transmogrification. 
King thus offers the Court the opportunity to clarify its current think-
ing on the interaction between the Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses.  
Demanding a judicial warrant except in a limited set of cases for which an 
established exception to the warrant requirement applies provides far more 
guidance to judges than asking them to decide what is reasonable in the to-
tality of the circumstances of individual cases.  This framework should not be 
cast aside casually.  In the context of DNA-BC, the Court could uphold (or 
strike down) mandatory acquisition of DNA for producing profiles for da-
tabases by articulating a new exception for biometric data generally—
without undermining the need for warrants as a default rule.86 
C. Applying the Chosen Test 
I turn to the third question: Do the stay-opinion cases apply the pu-
tatively omnipresent balancing test they have chosen in a well-considered 
way?  Anderson does not.  It purports to balance without even fully listing the 
  
by something less than probable cause.  As such, the sentence in Summers does not support 
dispensing with the established framework of categorical exceptions for searches. 
83. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 403 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001)). 
84. 519 U.S. 33 (1996). 
85. Id. at 40.  As with the level of force that is reasonable in making an arrest and the period of 
time for which residents can be denied access to a dwelling while conducting a search of the 
premises (see supra note 82), “[v]oluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all 
the circumstances.”  Robinette, 519 U.S. at 40. 
86. Kaye, supra note 71. 
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pertinent interests.  Most of the brief opinion simply insists that “the taking 
of DNA samples” is analogous to “the taking of fingerprints,”87 “that DNA 
samples should be treated like fingerprints,”88 and that “[f]ingerprinting an 
arrested suspect has long been considered a part of the routine booking 
process.”89  Haskell and Mitchell are less conclusory in their balancing.  Both 
opinions reason that the individual interest in refusing to reveal DNA markers 
of identity—assuming that they are nothing more than that—is weak.90  
Mitchell and Haskell also go some way toward demonstrating that the gov-
ernment’s interests in having DNA profiles as personal identifiers before trial 
and as possible leads to unsolved crimes are strong in toto.91  The conclusion 
that the government’s interests outweigh the individual’s then seems to follow. 
The specifics of the balancing analysis, however, require more atten-
tion.  Anderson’s analogy to fingerprints is imperfect.  Most obviously, the DNA 
samples contain a great deal of information that is useful for disease 
screening or other purposes.92  In addition, it is conceivable that some of the 
loci in the strictly identifying profiles could turn out to convey disease-related 
or other socially significant information that could harm an individual’s le-
gitimate interests.93  Mitchell and Haskell clearly recognized these facts.  Drawing 
on various DNA-AC opinions, these courts deemed statutory limitations on 
discovering or releasing medically relevant DNA information or samples 
sufficient to protect against misuse.94  Likewise, they followed the DNA-AC 
cases in rejecting as irrelevant to the constitutionality of the current system 
the mere possibility that DNA identification profiles would come to reveal 
sensitive personal traits, insisting that “[i]f and when such changes occur, 
future courts will be available to consider actual facts and applications, and 
determine whether the law, as then constituted, violates the Constitution.”95  
  
87. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 705 (Va. 2007). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 706. 
90. Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1058–62 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Mitchell, 652 
F.3d 387, 406–14 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
91. Haskell, 669 F.3d at 1062–65; Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 413–16. 
92. See, e.g., PETER TURNPENNY & SIAN ELLARD, EMERY’S ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL 
GENETICS (14th ed. 2012); NAT’L CENTER FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFORMATION, 
GENES AND DISEASE (1998), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK22183. 
93. Confusion on the extent to which this is probable abounds.  See David H. Kaye, Mopping Up 
After Coming Clean About “Junk DNA” (Nov. 27, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1032094; sources cited supra note 4. 
94. Haskell, 669 F.3d at 1061; Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 407–08. 
95. Haskell, 669 F.3d at 1062; accord Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 407 (“[T]he possibility that junk DNA 
may not be junk DNA some day also does not significantly augment [the defendant’s] privacy 
interest in the present case.” (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Weikert, 
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To this extent, the majority opinions in Mitchell and Haskell do reflect a con-
sidered analysis. 
To be sure, dissenting judges in these cases found this analysis of the 
genetic privacy arguments unsatisfying,96 but the opinions did not explicitly 
analyze the incentives that police have to mine DNA samples for infor-
mation on medical conditions or to deliver samples to insurers or employers 
who might be interested in such information (if they were to insure or hire 
the arrestees).  Perhaps the Mitchell and Haskell courts regarded such scenar-
ios as fanciful, or perhaps they were persuaded that even if the incentives were 
stronger, the statutory or administrative protections would be sufficient.97 
But none of the stay opinions explicitly consider whether acquiring DNA 
for a database system should be invalidated because the system could be made 
more protective of genetic privacy—for instance, by destroying the samples 
after the identifying information is recorded.  Nevertheless, if totality bal-
ancing means that one totals the costs and benefits (broadly understood) of a 
particular information-gathering system and upholds the system if the sum 
is positive rather than negative, then the marginal balancing becomes con-
stitutionally irrelevant.  That is, if one rejects marginal balancing, as the Supreme 
Court has, then the dispositive point is that the legislation is, on balance, 
positive—not that it could be improved on.98 
In brief, the three main stay-opinion cases do not fully address the issues of 
definition, methodology, and application that are essential to a considered 
analysis of the constitutionality of DNA-BC.  In King, the Court should at-
tend more carefully to the meaning of the terms “search” and “seizure” as 
they apply to distinct phases of the DNA database systems and should 
  
504 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 408 (“[W]e acknowledge 
the seriousness of Mitchell’s concerns about the possible misuse and future use of DNA 
samples . . . . Should technological advancements change the value of ‘junk DNA,’ 
reconsideration of our Fourth Amendment analysis may be appropriate.”). 
96. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 416 (Rendell, J., dissenting) (“In the face of such heightened privacy 
interests, statutory restrictions on the use of the DNA collected from suspects who have not 
been convicted of a crime, though not wholly irrelevant, are not panaceas.”). 
97. Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (holding that statutory and operational safeguards 
against unauthorized use of and access to records of prescriptions kept in a government 
database adequately protected individual privacy). 
98. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2632 (2010) (“This Court has ‘repeatedly 
refused to declare that only the least intrusive search practicable can be reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.’” (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 
(1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 
543, 557 n.12 (1976) (“The logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments 
could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers.”), 
quoted in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 n.40 (1979). 
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address the assumption that totality balancing has displaced the framework 
of categorical exceptions as the generally applicable mode of analysis for 
ascertaining reasonableness.99  Although these recommendations for a more 
considered doctrinal analysis do not dictate the outcome of that analysis, they 
would help to construct a more secure foundation than that which the three 
stay-opinion cases upholding DNA-BC have laid. 
II. THE “NO PEEKING” COMPROMISE OF MARIO W. 
In Mario W. v. Kaipio,100 the Arizona Supreme Court upheld, in part, 
an Arizona law that required the detention, pending an adjudication of de-
linquency, of all “juveniles charged with certain offenses and summoned to 
appear at an advisory hearing” who fail to provide a DNA sample for the 
state database.101  Vice Chief Justice Hurwitz’s unanimous opinion refreshingly 
recognizes the primacy of the categorical analysis of reasonableness for war-
rantless searches but then declines to use this framework because “[m]ost 
courts considering the constitutionality of DNA sampling and profiling have 
employed the totality of the circumstances test” and “[t]he parties do not dis-
pute the applicability of the totality of the circumstances test.”102 
Like Mitchell, Mario W. then recognizes that the laboratory’s distil-
lation of a DNA profile implicates a Fourth Amendment interest in infor-
mational privacy that is distinct from the Fourth Amendment interest in 
freedom from physical intrusion.  But, as we saw in Part I, Mitchell did not 
decide that this so-called second search was in and of itself an infringement 
of a reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz.  It merely weighed the 
informational privacy interest in passing on the constitutionality of the true 
search itself—the physical intrusion for the purpose of acquiring and using 
the arrestee’s DNA profile. 
In contrast, Mario W. severs the connection between the first two steps—
physical collection and laboratory testing—in the DNA database technology.  
It first reasons that because some juveniles will fail to appear for trial, the 
“minimal”103 interest of all juveniles in avoiding the indignity of buccal swabbing104 
  
99. As previously indicated, balancing under the special needs exception is one option, and a new, 
categorical exception is another.  See supra notes 71, 86. 
100. 281 P.3d 476 (Ariz. 2012). 
101. Id. at 476. 
102. Id. at 480. 
103. Id. at 481. 
104. With respect to the physical intrusion, Mario W. treats buccal swabbing as comparable to 
submitting to fingerprinting in its impact on bodily integrity and freedom of movement.  
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yields to the state’s “important interest in locating an absconding juvenile 
and, perhaps years after charges were filed, ascertaining that the person 
located is the one previously charged.”105  Thus, the state may hold the DNA 
sample—without examining it—until the juvenile flees or the charges are 
adjudicated.  Second, Mario W. reasons that the state may not determine the 
identification profile before the outcome of the trial.  Even if the trial leads 
to an adjudication of delinquency, the state has only a “speculative”106 
interest in waiting a “few weeks [for the] trial.”107  And, if the trial does not 
establish delinquency, then the delay prevents the innocent juvenile from 
being treated any differently than innocent juveniles or adults who are not 
even arrested.  The court therefore holds that the state may not peek at the 
DNA before conviction or flight.  In Arizona, then, arrestee DNA is like 
Schrödinger’s Cat, existing only in an indeterminate, unobserved state before the 
moment of truth.108 
A. “Intimate Personal Information” 
This no-peeking rule might make good sense if the laboratory process of 
extracting DNA strands and characterizing the small number of variable re-
  
The court states that “[i]t is clear that one arrested on probable cause may be compelled to give 
fingerprints to law enforcement.”  Id. (citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 725–28 (1969)).  
The Supreme Court, however, has never considered whether fingerprinting is permissible 
when there is no reason to believe that the prints will be useful in the investigation of the 
crime for which the individual has been arrested.  Davis holds that when fingerprints are acquired 
as a direct result of a false arrest—one for which there was no probable cause and whose only 
purpose was to gather prints—they are inadmissible as the fruit of an illegal seizure of the person.  
Davis, 394 U.S. at 724. 
105. Mario W., 281 P.3d at 482.  The court does not respond to the marginal balancing argument 
in King that fingerprints are good enough for this purpose. 
106. Id. at 483. 
107. Id.  Whether this analysis will endure is open to question.  Advances in technology making it 
possible to analyze profiles in a matter of hours or even minutes easily could extend the period of 
preconviction use.  See Peter M. Vallone, Inside the Black Box: Testing and Validation of a Rapid 
DNA Instrument, FORENSIC MAG., Sept. 28, 2011, http://www.forensicmag.com/article/inside-
black-box-testing-and-validation-rapid-dna-instrument.  In addition, what would happen if the 
law did not require the samples to be removed from the database in the event that the state does 
not prove delinquency?  Obviously, that would advance the state’s law enforcement interests 
(although it might not be politically popular).  The sad fact is that some people who are arrested 
but not convicted commit later crimes.  Of course, the mere fact that law enforcement could gain 
by monitoring more people cannot make such practices constitutional, but postadjudication 
retention of juvenile DNA profiles in all cases adds something to the state’s interests that is missing 
in the Arizona system of juvenile arrestee DNA databasing.  That enhancement would have to be 
considered in totality balancing for the more extensive system. 
108. See COLIN BRUCE, SCHRÖDINGER’S RABBITS: THE MANY WORLDS OF QUANTUM 59 
(2004). 
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gions that compose the identification profile were truly a separate search that 
exposed information in which the individual could claim a meaningful pri-
vacy interest.  The Arizona court certainly believed that it was.  The opinion 
speaks of “the serious intrusion on the privacy interests of the Juveniles oc-
casioned by the second search,”109 which exposes “intimate personal infor-
mation about the individual.”110 
What, then, is this “intimate personal information”?  Clearly, DNA 
identification profiles are personal in that they almost always differ among 
everyone except for identical twins.  In the court’s words, the profiles are 
“uniquely identifying information about individual genetics.”111  But one could 
say, with equal ease, that fingerprint images supply uniquely identifying 
information about individual dermatoglyphics. 
Like the three main stay opinions, Mario W. did not challenge the 
dogma that the identification profiles stored in DNA databases contain no 
medically or socially sensitive information.  The only “privacy concern”112 in 
“the nature of the information”113 that the Mario W. court articulated was 
that the profiles were destined for a database for criminal investigations.  The 
court wrote the following: 
The State argues that once it has lawfully obtained the cell sam-
ples, the Fourth Amendment provides no greater bar to the pro-
cessing of those samples and the extraction of the DNA profile 
than it does to the analysis of fingerprints.  But the State’s reliance 
are obtained, no further intrusion on the privacy of the individual is 
required before they can be used for investigative purposes.  In this 
sense, the fingerprint is akin to a photograph or voice exemplar.  But 
before DNA samples can be used by law enforcement, they must be 
physically processed and a DNA profile extracted. 
This second search presents a greater privacy concern than the 
buccal swab because it involves the extraction (and subsequent publication 
to law enforcement nationwide) of thirteen genetic markers from the 
  
109. Mario W., 281 P.3d at 483. 
110. Id. at 481. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 482. 
113. Id. (quoting Ashley Eiler, Note, Arrested Development: Reforming the Federal All-Arrestee DNA 
Collection Statute to Comply with the Fourth Amendment, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1201, 1220 
(2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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arrestee’s DNA sample that create a DNA profile effectively unique to 
that individual.114 
Surely, this is a distinction without a difference.  Traditionally in fin-
gerprinting, a physical sample (an exemplar) was collected from an arrestee 
with ink and paper, just as a physical sample is collected for DNA.115  These 
fingerprint samples, like DNA samples, do not speak for themselves.  They 
must be examined “before [the] samples can be used by law enforcement.”116  
Their information lies in ridge flow and minutiae, and these features must be 
studied by eye or by computer to extract useful data.117  Similarly, the DNA 
information lies in particular loci, and these features must be ascertained by 
chemical reactions and computers to extract useful data.  What matters is not 
the optics, the physics, or the chemistry, but the transformation of the sample 
into identifying information.  If extracting this information is a separate search 
for DNA, then extracting the identifying information also is a separate search for 
fingerprints.  If this so-called second search requires a warrant, flight, or a con-
viction, then it requires one of those preconditions before fingerprints are 
digitalized and stored in databases.  The argument about a second search in Mario 
W. falls flat.118 
B. Cells as Containers 
Or does it?  The Arizona court offered a second rationale for its no-peeking 
rule—the container doctrine of Fourth Amendment law.  The court argued 
  
114. Id. (citation omitted) (citing Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False 
Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 721, 726–30 
(2007)). 
115. Today, a digital scanner can be used to make electronic images of fingerprints in a single step.  
NIST EXPERT WORKING GRP. ON HUMAN FACTORS IN LATENT PRINT ANALYSIS, 
LATENT PRINT EXAMINATION AND HUMAN FACTORS: IMPROVING THE PRACTICE 
THROUGH A SYSTEMS APPROACH 4–5 (David H. Kaye ed., 2012) [hereinafter NIST 
REPORT]. 
116. Mario W., 281 P.3d at 482. 
117. NIST REPORT, supra note 115, at 4–5. 
118. One might try to rescue the argument with a different distinction between DNA samples and 
profiles, on the one hand, and fingerprint samples and features, on the other.  If the information 
recorded in the databases were sensitive enough to create a reasonable expectation of privacy for 
DNA profiles but not for fingerprint images, it would be at least plausible to argue that the 
extraction of information from a DNA sample actually is a search, whereas a fingerprint comparison 
never rises to this level.  See supra text accompanying notes 56–57.  Mario W., however, makes 
no claim that the DNA profile contains information above and beyond an individual’s 
identity. 
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that its novel approach was “consistent with precedent outside the DNA 
context.”119  Specifically, 
[i]n United States v. Chadwick, . . . the Supreme Court analyzed 
separately the legality of the seizure of a steamer trunk and the later 
opening of the trunk, holding the initial seizure reasonable but 
finding the later search unconstitutional.  Similarly, our court of appeals 
has held [in In re Tiffany O] that even if an officer may be justified 
under the circumstances in seizing a purse during a Terry stop, the 
same justification does not automatically allow the search of the purse. 
. . . The later search of the [DNA] sample . . . is, in effect, the 
analog to opening the steamer trunk in Chadwick and the purse in 
Tiffany O. to see what is inside.120 
The analogy looks good at first blush.  People surely have reasonable expec-
tations of privacy in the contents of their luggage and their purses.  The Orthodox 
Jew on Yom Kippur with an apple core in her purse, the Catholic juvenile 
with birth control pills in hers, and the English literature professor with sleazy 
novels in her trunk all have a fair claim to freedom from unregulated intrusions 
into their purses or luggage.  The police will all but inevitably espy these legal 
but embarrassing items if they look through containers without a warrant.  
The Fourth Amendment protects all of us—the angelic, the quotidian, and the 
felonious—from arbitrary searches of our possessions. 
But compare those searches with the laboratory analysis of epithelial 
cells.  The laboratory extracts a single kind of molecule—DNA.  It does not 
look at the rest of the cell.  Within the DNA, it looks only at a tiny fraction of 
the genome—generating a profile that the readers of database records cannot 
use to harm or embarrass anyone (except insofar as the person’s DNA matches a 
crime-scene sample).121  The situation begins to resemble cases in which dogs 
that (supposedly) alert only to drugs are used to sniff luggage or other containers— 
 
  
119. Mario W., 281 P.3d at 481. 
120. Id. (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 & n.8 (1977); In re Tiffany O., 174 
P.3d 282, 287 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007)). 
121. One qualification is in order.  The database custodian could compare two identification 
profiles to establish that one individual in a database is not the son or daughter of another individual 
or that two individuals are identical twins.  Establishing other family relationships from the 
current profiles alone is not feasible.  See David H. Kaye, The Genealogy Detectives: A Constitutional 
Analysis of ‘Familial Searching,’ 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2043091. 
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a practice that the Court held in United States v. Place122 and Illinois v. Caballes123 
does not even rise to the level of a search.124 
Because the government does not look through the parts of the genome in 
which an individual has a strong expectation of privacy, a better analogy is required.  
Imagine, then, that every time a person commits a crime, a mysterious being 
delivers an envelope to the police that always contains exactly two things—a card 
with the name of an individual who was at the scene of the crime (but not nec-
essarily at the time the crime occurred) and a key to a safe deposit box in that 
person’s name.  Is opening the envelope a search that triggers the need for a warrant 
or an exception to the warrant requirement?  All that the container cases establish 
is that the police must abide by the constitutional requirements for searches before 
they can use the key to open the safe deposit box.  The box, of course, is the vast 
part of the human genome that the police do not open in DNA testing for 
identity.  In DNA profiling for law enforcement databases, they only read the name 
on the card. 
Thus, there is a solid argument that the laboratory analysis is not a “later 
search,”125 let alone one that is so destructive of important personal interests as 
to clearly overcome the various state interests in arrestee DNA databases.  The 
mere fact that testing or inspection produces information about a substance being 
analyzed is not sufficient to create a reasonable expectation of privacy when that 
information only links a defendant to a crime.  Thus, in United States v. Jacobsen,126 
a federal agent performed a field test on white powder in a damaged Federal 
Express package that the company inspected and called to his attention.  The 
Court reasoned that because “[a] chemical test that merely discloses whether 
or not a particular substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate 
interest in privacy,”127 the chemical testing was not itself “a search subject to 
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the Fourth Amendment.”128  A bare desire to avoid being linked to a crime (at 
least through a method that is highly accurate) deserves no Fourth Amendment 
protection.  Because DNA laboratories do not rummage through the genome for 
information that merits protection, the container cases are inapposite.  When 
the data acquisition procedure is sufficiently narrow in its scope, as in Jacobsen, 
Place, and Caballes, it is not a search.  The distillation of the data from the bio-
logical sample therefore is not a second search, even though, as Mario W. rightly 
observes, it implicates distinct interests from swabbing the cheek or pricking 
the finger of an arrestee.  The DNA profile may be unique, and it certainly is an 
inherited characteristic of the individual, but not all that is genetic and unique is 
“intimate personal information” that merits constitutional protection. 
CONCLUSION 
The four opinions said to provide a considered analysis of the constitu-
tionality of DNA collection and databasing before conviction do not supply the 
final analysis.  The three main opinions lack precision in defining a search or 
seizure; they invoke a balancing standard on the basis of a questionable un-
derstanding of the place of balancing in Fourth Amendment analysis; and the 
balancing they undertake is somewhat circumscribed.  The fourth opinion avoids 
some of these difficulties but then perceives “intimate personal information” where 
none is present and misapplies the Supreme Court’s container cases to that 
information. 
In King, the Supreme Court will have to delve more deeply into the three 
questions I have identified.  It must evaluate the actual interests implicated by 
preconviction searches, properly defined; articulate the appropriate framework for 
evaluating the reasonableness of warrantless searches in general; and attend to the 
complexities in applying that framework to the biology of DNA identification 
tests and to the limited information recorded in DNA databases.  An opinion that 
accomplishes these tasks should supply not only a truly “considered analysis” of the 
constitutionality of DNA-BC but also much needed guidance on the limits of 
totality balancing in all Fourth Amendment cases. 
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